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Green is fashionable. Green is cool. Green is profitable. Being green is considered sound 
economics. Ever since the Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987) the marriage between economy and ecology has been sanctified, their 
interdependence officially acknowledged. How that marriage is conceived and consummated, 
however, makes a crucial difference to the way environmental degradation and the 
production of hazards are responded to. As one would expect, money plays a central role in 
those relations and, much less expected, so does the socio-economic relation to time. In this 
paper I want to establish a link between economic and temporal assumptions that underpin 
this marriage and relate these habits of mind to socio-environmental practices. The purpose is 
not to come up with a blueprint for environmental action but to reflect on the setting and 
conditions to those actions and consider what, if anything, may be required to improve the 
current socio-economic conditions on the basis of which sustainable futures are to be 
achieved. Three central and interdependent metaphors – the ‘clockwork universe’, ‘rational 
man’ and ‘spaceship earth’ – will serve as the backcloth against which the analysis is 
developed. 
The metaphor of the clockwork universe dates back to the very beginning of modernity. It 
entails an understanding of time and temporal relations that fundamentally altered what had 
hitherto been the accepted norm. It changed what had been unalterable facts of human time, 
that is, finitude, transience and rhythmicity. With the invention of the clock, time became 
subject to human design. With clock time as source of socio-economic organisation and 
regulation the emphasis shifted from finitude, ephemerality, irreversible change, uncertainty, 
context dependence and rhythmicity to endless repetitions of the same irrespective of context. 
Time in the clockwork universe is circular, linear-spatial and decontextualised. As long as its 
external energy source is in tact, it runs invariably along a predetermined path. Its direction is 
tied not to the irreversibility of human existence but to the convention of the number system 
whereby the number two follows the number one and not the other way around. It is infinitely 
divisible with, it seems, no lower limit to its ‘units’. Time encoded in number becomes 
amenable to quantification and measurement. As machine time it is principally knowable and 
as such open to prediction and control. Clock time with its very specific temporal 
characteristics is central to the social relations and institutions of the industrial way of life. It 
underpins all economic activity and forms the unquestioned base upon which environmental 
policy and regulation are framed and developed. 
The pedigree of ‘rational man’, the second metaphor, dates back almost as far as that of the 
clockwork universe to the age of science and reason. Rational man is homo economicus. He 
acts with impeccable selfishness and economic self-interest. He commodifies and colonises, 
controls and calculates. As consumer he uses cost-benefit analyses to come to decisions. This 
means, he makes his choices on the basis of a known past and a discounted future. He is the 
key actor in Garrett Harding’s Tragedy of the Commons (1968/1992) where individual 
freedom in a commons, brings ruin to all. As independent, rational, free enterprise agent, 
rational man ends up fowling his own nest, consuming and polluting his way to extinction. 
Harding uses as his example a piece of communal grazing land, a common asset that can 
support only a strictly limited number of animals before the ‘resource’ is overgrazed and 
deteriorates to a point where everyone loses out. From the collective’s perspective it makes 
sense to keep to the optimal number of grazing animals that maintain the health and 
reproductive capacity of the land. From the perspective of self-interested individuals, 
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however, it is rational and economically prudent to maximise the number of their own 
animals feeding on that free resource. This brings the highest profit to them now – in the 
present and the immediate/short-term future – at minimum expense, since the costs of this 
action are going to be carried equally by all members of the collective and are not to be paid 
for until some time in the future. The individuals’ profit, moreover, can be invested and 
thereby increase personal wealth. For rational man, concern for the collective good makes no 
economic sense; it is simply irrational. Prevention of the collective demise is therefore to be 
achieved through externally applied constraint and made possible on the basis that rational 
man follows a rule-governed set of selfish actions, which makes his behaviour not only 
knowable and predictable but controllable. 
In contrast to the above, ‘spaceship earth’ is a much more recent metaphor that emerged in 
the second part of the twentieth century. It arose in response to an accumulation of 
environmental problems that were no longer amenable to the established ways of dealing 
with natural limits and resource issues. The metaphor conveys a world in which there are no 
more open frontiers to be conquered, a densely populated world of limited space, precarious 
resource base and restricted capacity to absorb the waste products, a world in which 
imperialism, colonialism and migration are no longer viable answers to the problems 
associated with the industrial way of life. As with the clockwork metaphor, earth is a man-
made machine, a technological creation constructed from separate, interchangeable parts. It 
assumes that scientists and engineers are able to establish why things go wrong since in 
technologically produced artefacts cause-and-effect links are traceable through the system in 
both directions, that is, forwards and backwards in time. It implies that as a socio-
technological creation spaceship earth is principally knowable, that associated actions and 
reactions are quantifiable and ultimately predictable and that it is amenable to techno-
scientific control and technological fixes. As a bounded system spaceship earth is encased 
and hermetically sealed. This means, on the one hand, that it is safeguarded from outside 
atmospheric incursions and, on the other, that its clearly definable, quantifiable and 
measurable internal resources are limited and finite. Protection of those finite and thus limited 
resources is to be achieved through tight public control and their distribution to be 
collectively organised. Key elements of the assumptions associated with the metaphor can be 
found in much of the economic debates around environmental protection and guide 
discussions on environmental cost-benefit analyses and pollution credits. 
When looked at in isolation, these three metaphors seem no more than overdrawn caricatures, 
burlesque exaggerations that bear little resemblance to the way contemporary 
environmentalists and environmental economists view the world and socio-environmental 
activity. In this paper I want to show how the assumptions associated with the three 
metaphors have become taken-for-granted habits of mind that have entered the deep structure 
of social understanding and to demonstrate how they are acted out as environmental 
knowledge practices. As social theorist and time scholar I will want to give a temporal slant 
to the analysis of these issues before I identify some practices that contradict those 
assumptions, that currently operate in the shadows of the time economy of environmental 
relations. My argument is that habits of mind and practices form a powerful and inseparable 
union and that some of these unacknowledged and unquestioned assumptions need to be 
changed if environmental actions and policies are to become more appropriate to the 
contemporary condition. As such I draw and build on the path-breaking work of Adelheid 
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Biesecker and her colleagues from the German Network Vorsorgendes Wirtschaften1 who 
have been tireless in their efforts to effect such change in habits of heart and mind. 
1. Clocks, Bodies and Networks 
Clocks represent a technological time created to human design. Their function is precise, 
their time quantifiable and predictable, unitary and standardized, decontextualised and 
abstracted from processes and change phenomena. With clock time, the variable times of 
nature – of day and night, seasons and change, growth and ageing, birth and death – are 
objectified, constituted independent of life and cosmic processes, of human activity and 
social organisation. In the public world of economic and political transactions, this techno-
time is superimposed on the embodied and multi-dimensional times of social life, organisms, 
ecological interdependencies, the solar and planetary systems. Clock time envelops the 
multiple features of socio-cultural and natural times: the time frame, sequence and duration, 
the now point and timing, tempo and synchronisation, process time and rhythmicity. Clock 
time is the prism through which much of the lived temporal relations are refracted. Moreover, 
the abstract, standardised form of time allows or the integration of all levels of reality – 
cosmic, physical, biological, and cultural – as well as all known historical periods (Elias 
1992) and it serves as a base to translate one quantity into another: labour can be translated 
into money; risks can be calculated for insurance purposes; historical periods can be related 
to each other. Created externally, clock time can function as a symbol for orientation, 
regulation and control.  
This clock time is the foundation for temporal relations that characterise the industrial way of 
life: the equation of time with money; the link between speed, efficiency and profit; the 
globalisation of clock time as standard and economic norm; and more generally the control in 
all spheres of economic activity and public life. A slower, measured pace had to give way to 
the speeding up and general acceleration of daily life and work. Times when nothing 
happens, breaks and pauses, waiting and rest came to be considered unproductive, wasteful, 
lost opportunities. Time became equated with money, which is possible only on the basis of 
'empty time', a time separated from content and context, disembodied from events. Only as an 
abstract, standardised unit can time become a medium for exchange and a neutral value in the 
calculation of efficiency and profit; only in this form can time become commodified.  
In societies where time is equated with money, faster means better, increased speed 
constitutes progress: a faster aeroplane is considered more advanced than a slower one. A fast 
worker is seen as an asset to a company, a slow one considered a drain on its resources. 
Crucial to the contemporary speed valorisation is the economic investment-return-profit 
cycle, that is, the payment of interest for the time of money borrowed. In addition to profit 
and interest as motivating forces for the high value of speed, competition plays a central role. 
This applies whether the ‘product’ is a news story, a new drug, a new invention or a new 
fashion trend. Thus, when time is money and speed is equated with efficiency and 
competitiveness then time compression and intensification of processes seem inevitable.2 
This quest for time compression has reached its zenith with electronic communication where 
                                            
1For an early publication of the Network see Busch-Lüty et al. 1994; also Biesecker 1998. 
2 This argument was first presented by Karl Marx 1867/1976 in Capital Volume I where he argued that in a context of competition the 
commodified labour time as abstract exchange value had to be intensified in order for business to stay competitive and profitable. 
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process times have been reduced to zero whilst the reach across space has become unlimited 
and instantaneous. 
This instantaneity and simultaneity of communication technology underpins the globalisation 
of time. Colonisation with time has been achieved with the aid of standard time, time zones 
and world time, the globally organised time system that began to be implemented towards the 
end of the nineteenth century. Colonisation of time, in contrast, relates to the time values 
associated with the industrial way of life. In the latter case it is the time values and the social 
relations of industrial time that are being adopted as well as imposed on a worldwide basis as 
unquestioned norm.3 This industrial norm, as I suggested above, is fundamentally rooted in 
clock-time and underpinned by naturalised assumptions about not just the capacity but also 
the need to commodify, compress and control time. 
Closer inspection makes apparent that the unifying clock time economy of money divides as 
it unites: not everyone’s time is of equal value. While the money rich tend to be time poor, 
they can exchange their money for time. They can buy labour saving devises and they can 
purchase the time of others in the form of skills and services to make up the short fall of their 
own time. For the time rich and money poor, in contrast, the equivalent exchange tends not to 
be an option. The time of children and the elderly, (unremunerated/unemployed) single 
parents and carers, women subsistence farmers and those locked into bartering relations tends 
not to provide them with a basis for economic wealth creation. As ‘unproductive’ labour, 
their unremunerated work in household and school, care relations and food production is 
rendered invisible, their time decreed ‘worthless’. Outside the charmed circle of the tightly 
delimited time economy, their time gets positioned at the bottom of the hierarchy of temporal 
relations4. As long as the underpinning assumptions remain naturalised, taken-for-granted and 
unquestioned, unwilling recipients will find it difficult if not impossible to make their protests 
heard and understood, let alone accepted as meaningful and legitimate. Only when fault lines 
in the logic become exposed and irresolvable contradictions begin to destroy the system from 
within can alternative visions take hold and openings for change be operationalised.  
This is precisely what happened with the rise and accumulation of environmental problems. 
In agriculture the consistent application of the logic has given rise to sick animals, and new 
diseases such as Mad Cow Disease (BSE) and Creutzfeld Jakob Disease (CJD), to the genetic 
modification of crops that threatens the entire organic food sector, to practices in animal 
husbandry of unparalleled cruelty. In transport it works against a wider range of initiatives 
towards more sustainable modes of mobility. Regarding social organisation in the widest 
sense, it underpins the inexorable move towards acceleration and the 24/7 society. In business 
and the corporate world it is implicated in downsizing and the externalisation of costs to 
society, in hostile takeovers that raid pension funds and extract unproductive wealth from 
taxpayers and the productive economy.5 Businesses are going bankrupt and employees are 
being made redundant on an unprecedented scale. Responsible and environmentally sound 
businesses are declared inefficient while corporate raiding is decreed virtuous, aided with tax 
incentives and rewarded with massive bonus payments. With communication at near the 
                                            
3 For example, for Japan see Nishimoto 1997, for Russia see Castells 1996.  
4 For am more detailed argument on this point, see Adam (2002) 
5 On corporate cannibalism and predatory finance, see Korten (1995): 183-257. For a link to temporal relations and socio-environmental 
hazard production, see Adam (1998). 
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speed of light, finally, the gap necessary for creating a competitive edge has been lost and 
entirely new sources for gaining economic advantage have to be sought. 
Wherever the logic of the clock-time based time economy is rigorously applied it leads not 
only to the by now familiar successes of the industrial system but also to its excesses: the 
global quest for economic growth is accompanied by an absolute increase in poverty and 
destitution not just in the majority (third) world but also amongst the poor of industrialised 
nations. The rise in speed and efficiency is accompanied by gridlock, stress and 
unproductivity. The more embodied time is transcended and controlled, it seems, the more 
the future is open, unpredictable and beyond control. It means that increase in time control 
goes hand in hand with a decrease in control over outcomes (Adam 2004).  
Focus on one of these contradictions gives us an insight into the complexities and opens a 
window on the paradoxes involved. The network time of information and communication 
technology (ICT) can serve as an example. This network time is superimposed on and 
interacts with the dominant clock time relations, which in turn have supplanted embodied 
times, that is, the rhythmic times of nature and cosmos, the irreversible times of life and the 
finite time of human existence. We may summarise the differences in the following way: 
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Time 
embodied  
is contextual 
is interdependent 
is being and becoming 
is duration, succession & cycle  
is birth and death, growth and ageing 
is all of past & future gathered up in the present  
is rhythmic repetition with variation: invariability is death 
is re/production, regeneration and repair/healing  
is temporality, timing, tempo, intensity 
is internalised memory & history 
is finite & transcendent  
is multi-layered 
is creative 
is life 
 
 
Time 
of clocks  
is artefactual  
is linear-spatial 
is infinitely divisible  
is quantified and measured  
is empty, neutral, decontextualised 
is counting oscillations represented by number 
is repetition of the same irrespective of when and where 
is invariable (variation is clock going wrong) 
is creation of time to human design 
is naturalised as time per se  
is imposed circularity 
is externalised  
is machine 
is dead 
 
 
Time 
of ICT 
is diverse 
is interconnected 
is system-transcending 
is ephemeral and enduring  
is instantaneous and simultaneous 
is all of present, everywhere and nowhere 
is internalised memory of space transcending now 
is non-sequential and non-chronological 
is undifferentiated & fragmented 
is immediate & timeless  
is beyond control  
is real time 
is flow 
 
 
Deleted: ¶
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The three time systems cannot be mapped onto each other; yet, we tend to move between 
them with ease, giving little thought to the matter. We deftly negotiate their incompatibilities, 
embrace their contradictions, take the paradoxes for granted and leave accompanying 
problems mostly unquestioned. While we are competent in knowing how to proceed, 
reflection on the implications of those structural dissonances seems to be in short supply. 
When looked at in relation to each other, clock time seems irrelevant for globally networked 
information processes at the speed of light; yet, it has lost none of its relevance for the 
context in which those processes take place just as embodied time has lost none of its 
pertinence as the context in which the contradictory interdependence of the clock and 
network time is played out. All three timescapes are interdependent and mutually implicating. 
All three have their contradictory logics enacted on a daily basis when we activate the net, 
deal with employment matters, engage in environmental debates, take a train or an aeroplane 
to attend a conference. Since temporal perspectives and relations do not exist in a vacuum, 
we now need to connect them to assumptions encoded in the ‘rational man’ and ‘spaceship 
earth’ metaphors respectively. 
2. Economic Rationality and the Question of Morals 
For economists who subscribe to a Hobbesian view of human nature – that people are selfish 
and rationally pursue their own best interest unless curbed by socio-political regulations – 
there is an inescapable need for economic, political and legal instruments to counter human 
nature and market forces. Since ‘rational man’ will pursue his happiness and economic 
wealth to the detriment not just of the wider community but ultimately himself, it is the 
responsibility of the collective or its representatives to impose regulations that curb this 
destructive potential and guide it instead towards productive ends. 
The instruments available to impose such curbs are many and diverse. They can be of an 
economic, a legal and a political nature; most measures however are based on a combination 
of these. For analysts with a strong commitment to economic principles and ideals, it is 
important that the collective measures are designed in such a way that they do not interfere at 
the micro level in the successful operation of the market yet effectively curb the excesses of 
the market forces. For Michael Jacobs (1991: 125) this means, ‘choosing the macroeconomic 
outcomes of economic activity, not the laying down of its microeconomic methods’. He 
wants this approach differentiated from the traditional one which took a far more 
individualistic stance where specific kinds of pollution such as car exhaust emissions were 
targeted at source rather than with reference to the overall level of pollution, degradation or 
hazard. The difference, he argues, is crucial since fitting of catalytic converters to cars, for 
example, will not reduce the overall level of pollution as long as the numbers of cars and their 
use keep rising. When the focus of attention is on the overall problem, so his argument goes, 
the understanding of the causes will change and the proposed solutions will consequently 
differ substantially from those that seek to tackle the problem at source. On the face of it, this 
approach seems to be the only meaningful way to reduce overall pollution, environmental 
degradation and the production of hazards. 
Yet, when emphasis on macroeconomic outcomes is combined with economic reasoning and 
the full cluster of clock-time assumptions it brings forth such bizarre regulations as pollution 
credits which are attached to the US Clean Air Act of 1990 and more recent legislation on 
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water purity. Like milk quota, these credits can be bought and sold on the market. There is, 
however, a difference: pollution is not like milk. While the principle makes sense at a 
quantitative level it fails miserably when we acknowledge the qualitative and temporal 
dissimilarity between the two ‘products’. Under such a scheme, everyone is given an upper 
ceiling for pollution, which means companies that are heavy polluters have to buy extra 
credits, whilst low polluters can sell theirs and thus make money on the basis of their ‘virtue’. 
The argument is that the rational economic response is to pollute less and less because it costs 
money. So far so good. But what are we to make of the notion of under-pollution, and where 
is the inequality in wealth between nations to come into this? Economists argue that this 
measure works in the favour of Third World countries: they can swap their pollution credits 
for hard currency! Since they desperately need money to pay off their debts to the First 
World, they are deemed extremely fortunate since, as ‘under-polluters’, they can now 
exchange their debts for pollution, that is, trade a bad future for a more acceptable present. A 
second conundrum emerges when we consider that the implicit message might not be the 
need to be frugal with pollution but rather that pollution (by industrial nations) has become a 
right, a right for those who can afford it, a right upon which money, even fortunes, can be 
made, a right upon which political leaders can trade their citizens’ physical well-being as well 
as the basis of existence of future generations of humans and other species. 
Implicated in any of the macro economic solutions to environmental problems are Cost-
Benefit Analysis (CBA) and discounting, two economic measures that form an integral and 
unquestioned part of the economic tool kit. Both rely on calculation with its associated 
dependence on quantification and measurement, on visible surface phenomena and linear 
causality, on past-based knowledge and the pursuit of certainty. Furthermore, when these 
premises are unquestioningly coupled with assumptions encoded in the metaphor of the 
clockwork universe, that is, with ‘time is money’, ‘speed means profit and productivity’, 
‘standardization increases time control’, ‘the export of commodified time and its adoption 
across the world is an unmitigated good thing’, then those good intensions often materialise 
in strange and environmentally dubious forms. Let me explain. 
At the simplest level, CBA is the comparison between costs and benefits of an action and/or 
its effect. With respect to the environment, CBA starts from the assumption that solutions to 
environmental problems involve costs. The action might be pollution control or prevention, 
the development of cleaner technology or less harmful chemicals; it may be not felling a rain 
forest, re-routing a planned road or pipeline or re-siting an urban development. Costs are 
assumed to occur for both action and non-action, for development and lost opportunities since 
non-exploitation automatically means a loss of money and opportunity costs. It is further 
presupposed that both costs and benefits can be established by asking people: ask the car 
manufacturer what it will cost to take out all the harmful substances from diesel fuel, ask 
asthma sufferers what it is worth for them to have the cleaner air. The comparison of costs 
with benefits, it is argued, allows us to make rational decisions about which actions make 
economic sense and which do not. The benefits of CBA are considered self-evident: once we 
begin to start paying for the resource, i.e. nature, we not only treat it with more care and 
reverence but we also do our best (because it is in rational man’s self-interest) to avoid the 
pain of having to pay for the damage. Therefore, if this method is extensively applied, so the 
argument goes, environmental protection will be immeasurably enhanced. Since I am 
concerned here to critique some of the central assumptions that underpin economic measures 
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like CBA rather than CBA as an environmental policy per se, a few examples of the problems 
associated with the practice will suffice to support the argument. 
Critics have rightly pointed out that while it may be reasonably straightforward to establish 
the financial costs of pollution abatement to the polluter, it is far more tricky to calculate the 
benefits to the recipient. First there is the substantial difference between people being asked 
how much they are willing to pay for a clean ‘resource’ such as air or bathing water and 
being questioned about how much compensation they should be paid for the polluted air and 
water. Then there is the small issue that people’s capacity to pay differs widely, leading to the 
obvious conclusion that it is far more cost effective to pollute the environments of the poor. 
Next, there are a number of pertinent, if inconvenient, questions: ‘What if the benefit is 
priceless?’ ‘What if the effects cannot be known due to the vast time-distantiation of the 
processes involved?’ ‘What if we cannot ask those affected because they live on the other 
side of the globe or are not even born yet?’ And, finally, ‘how do you establish equivalencies 
between death in degrees through radiation, asbestos or hormone-disrupting chemicals; the 
loss of ozone; your child crippled by asthma; beaches covered in faeces and/or oil globules; 
and the loss of a rare snail, a heath-land or an ancient peat-bog?’  
If we take as our example the globally dispersed hormone-disrupting chemicals, which do 
their damage at the embryonic stage of foetal development but do not emerge as symptom 
until adulthood, it will quickly become obvious that the dependence on calculation, 
quantification, and measurement and the practice of asking people to express their choices in 
monetary terms is not only impracticable but also impossible. As soon as we are dealing with 
non-linear, non-proportional, time-space distantiated processes, the assumptions 
underpinning the clockwork universe and the rational man metaphors respectively become 
meaningless. That is to say, with hazards such as hormone-disrupting chemicals, the principle 
assumptions become inoperable long before we encounter the impossibility of asking 
embryos about the price they would put on their future health and fertility; long before we 
could consider what price could possibly be put on the slow invisible destruction of the 
capacity to regenerate and reproduce life on earth; long before we could ask what price tag 
would be appropriate for the ‘lost resource’ of future generations of humans.  
The second unquestioned tool involves the relationship to the future. Rational man discounts 
the future, which means according the future less value than the present6. This devaluation of 
the future makes perfect sense within a scheme that assumes that individuals act to maximise 
their self-interest. Given the choice, it is argued, a person would prefer to have £1000 in their 
hands today rather than in ten years time. This money could be invested now and would 
therefore be worth much more in ten years than £1000. This means, by today’s value and at a 
discount rate of 10% per annum over a period of ten years, the future £1000 is calculated to 
be worth a mere £386 today. From the standpoint of the present, projected into the future and 
back again, the future is less important than the present and, given a long enough time span, it 
is in this scheme of things worthless. This logic is proving particularly troublesome when it is 
applied to the long-term problems associated with environmental hazards. As the devaluation 
of the future increases with temporal distance – £1,000,000 of a hundred years hence are 
calculated to be worth a mere £75 today; a few more years and this huge sum of money it is 
                                            
6 For an excellent detailed economic treatise on this subject see Price 1993; for a more general introduction see Jacobs 1991; for a time-
ecological perspective, see Adam (1998) Deleted: .
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worth nothing from today’s perspective. That is to say, for homo economicus, the present of 
future generations who will have to cope with the legacy of hormone-disrupting chemicals, 
radiation, genetically modified organisms and industrial farming practices is of zero value, 
thus of no concern. Only the benefits accrued from today’s innovations and economic 
prosperity are entered into the equation. 
When the combined logic of the clockwork universe and rational man is consistently applied 
a number of anomalies arise that put great strain on the system and first signs of imploding 
tendencies can be observed. Deforestation, the result of unsustainable logging, has adverse 
effects not just on local communities but the global environment. The pursuit of competitive 
advantage in the chemical industry affects by now every living creature on this earth, 
disrupting the hormonal system and impairing fertility. The petrochemical and fishing 
industries between them have ensured dwindling fish stocks, with many species having 
declined beyond points of no return. Since Growth National Product (GNP) is a measure of 
economic activity, the growth of waste, pollution and associated diseases, as well as 
environmental hazards, accidents and disasters are all counted as (positive) measures of GNP. 
The industrial way of life has begun to affect the absorption and regenerative capacity of air, 
soil and water, with damage to the ozone layer, erosion and loss of topsoil, and chemical 
pollution of oceans and ground water being pertinent examples.  
Moreover, the transnational institutions created to safeguard communal interests on a global 
scale from an all too zealously applied economic logic at the individual, company or national 
level have turned out to protect not the global commons but the corporate interest. We are 
dealing here with an ideological confederation of institutions and practices that comprises 
transnational corporations and international trade agreements, globalised financial markets 
and global institutions such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. Despite 
their powerful roles in our lives, however, these institutions are neither accountable nor liable 
for their socio-environmental effects. Far from being democratic in the political sense of 
social accountability and responsibility, they are answerable only to the authority of money. 
In the economic pursuit of unimpeded flow and accumulation of money, they function on the 
basis of rationalised, de-contextualised socio-environmental irresponsibility. It means, this 
ideological confederation is marked by a common commitment to the creation of money and 
an explicit non-allegiance to people and places. Money is both the lifeline and the exclusive 
measure of value. The potential for maximum profit dictates where corporations, for 
example, place their operations and deposit their pollution. Concern for environmental 
sustainability becomes a source of economic inefficiency and weakness. Equally, when 
environmental regulations stand in the way of maximum profit it tends to be cheaper to up the 
operation and move it to a country that has less stringent environmental protection laws than 
to comply with the regulations. Environmental commentators have designated this a ‘race to 
the bottom’, a downward spiral where the financially optimal and socio-environmentally 
worst condition becomes the baseline for economic relations and modes of production: lowest 
wages, lowest safety standards, lowest company expenditure, lowest environmental 
protection and concern, elimination of barriers and regulations. In light of the current 
condition, Michael Jacobs (1991: xiii) and numerous others have argued that environmental 
damage and the manufacture of environmental hazards are not ‘an incidental consequence of 
economic activity’, rather, they are a ‘central feature of the ways in which production and 
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consumption are currently organised’. Moreover, this production of hazards feeds and breeds 
on the assumptions that underpin rational man’s economic activities. 
At the same time, however, there is a world beyond rationally calculated action in pursuit of 
economic self-interest, beyond abstraction and decontextualisation, beyond the quest for 
mastery and control. Contrary to expectation this ‘other’ to the clockwork universe of 
‘rational man’ is not the ‘natural’ world of ‘irrational woman’; rather, it is the trans-gendered 
world of morals and spirituality, of care and compassion for fellow humans beings and 
creatures, a world in which relations, interdependencies and indeterminacies are 
acknowledged and multiple time worlds with their associated contradictions embraced. Here 
people of all ages and ethnic origin group together to protest against the excesses of the 
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and Corporate capitalism. They take up 
the cause of laboratory animals and organic farmers, protect trees and support endangered 
communities and species. Importantly, in the context of this discussion, they combine their 
academic and political prowess to work towards a socio-economic system of greater equity 
and long-term sustainability. The question to be addressed next is whether or not ‘spaceship 
earth’ is the appropriate metaphor for this endeavour. 
3. Spaceships and Timescapes 
In his classic essay The Economics of the Coming of Spaceship Earth (1968) Kenneth 
Boulding argued that we no longer have limitless open frontiers to colonise and inhabit, that 
the contemporary world is instead one of too any people, not enough resources and 
insufficient capacity to absorb our waste and pollution. He developed the image of a 
spaceship and its crew to get across his points about interdependence and the need to live 
within our means, to recycle and to find ways not to externalise the problems and costs. The 
appeal is to our rational self-interest. Once we understand ourselves as part of a closed 
system, so his argument goes, the absurdity and destructiveness of our actions will become 
apparent and this realisation will help us on the path to more sustainable environmental 
relations.  
The metaphor is powerful and appealing. It presents complex issues in a simple and thus 
manageable form. It gives out messages about ‘can do’ as long as we are willing. The belief 
in the capacity to deal with and control the problems is never questioned. Boulding’s 
spaceship is a closed system involving people and things encased in and aided by technology. 
Thus, emphasis is on space and matter. As for time, it is there in form of the ticking clock, 
counting us down, every minute getting us closer to the point of self-destruction – if we don’t 
change our ways. This means that key temporal features of socio-environmental hazards are 
excluded from the image since closed systems negate the immanent time of change and 
transience, of contingency and potential, of entropy and creative regeneration. Closure is 
problematic, moreover, since earth is inseparably dependent on the sun’s energy and the sun-
earth-moon system in turn tied to the solar system and from there indefinitely to the furthest 
reaches of the universe. The boundaries, in other words, are arbitrary and are relative to the 
applied theory and perspective. An important point to appreciate here is that from a temporal 
perspective closed systems are dead systems. For there to be life and change, systems have to 
interact, transact and exchange as integral aspects of wider wholes: they have to be open and 
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their processes contextual and contingent. This, of course, makes the assumption of control 
based on sound management more problematic. 
Let us consider this issue. The capacity to manage is dependent upon a number of essential 
preconditions. Central among these is the boundedness of that which is to be managed, that 
phenomena and their effects are delimited not just in space but also in time, that they occur in 
a known place and have a discernible beginning and end – note the link here to the spaceship 
earth metaphor. Equally fundamental is a reliance on the ability to establish causal 
connections and identify causal chains of events, which means, unambiguous relationships 
across time and space. Third, and closely allied, is the expectancy that cause and effect are 
proportional, that small causes have small effects and big events have proportionally large 
impacts. A fourth crucial prerequisite to management is the accessibility to measurement, 
quantification and control. Finally, ‘solutions’ are constructed on the basis of a known past 
projected into the future. All but the most simple environmental problems put these 
presuppositions into question. Whether we are encountering the impact of synthetic 
chemicals, ozone depletion, air and water pollution, radiation, or a new disease such as BSE, 
the defining features seem to be spatio-temporal unboundedness, non-proportionality, time-
space distantiation, contingency, and a high level of indeterminacy. Moreover, industrially 
produced and induced environmental hazards and degradations tend to be characterised by 
invisibility and periods of latency after which outcomes are no longer traceable with certainty 
to original sources. Often problems are only recognisable as such after they have been 
identified through the mediating loop of science and once they have been brought to public 
attention through media representation.  
The socio-environmental conditions are at odds, therefore, with base assumptions that 
underpin the ‘management’ of the environment which include the belief that visible 
symptoms can guide ameliorative action and that clock-time and linearity exhaust the range 
of temporal facets. Time lags, latency periods and broken event chains as well as the gap 
between perception and impact, between Merk- and Wirkwelt, transform the quest for 
certainty, calculation and control into an impossible dream. Moreover, since the interaction of 
rational technological systems with open, generative ecological processes creates inescapable 
indeterminacy, the future cannot be managed on the bases of past experiences. At the same 
time, however, environmental hazards are always symptoms of past actions that require 
responses. Furthermore, since effects cannot be delimited, that is, since they extend 
potentially globally into an open-ended future, it is difficult if not impossible to establish 
meaningful objectives and targets. We tend to be able to ignore these difficulties as long as 
we conceive of the environment in spatial terms. That is to say, the environment as spaceship, 
as a global realm of dwelling, gives the illusion of conventional manageability and control. 
As soon as we re-focus and re-conceptualise the issues in temporal terms as a Wirkwelt, 
however, what had previously gone unnoticed becomes obvious. 
4. Memories of the Future 
When the modernist project of mastery fails we enter the realm of morals and values, of care 
and responsibility. That is to say, when the conceptual tools of classical economics, science 
and politics become inappropriate, alternative assumptions begin to come to the fore. 
Examples of these new knowledge practices can be found across the world both within and 
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outside industrial and industrialising societies in self-help groups and communal actions, in 
social movements and non-governmental organisations, in political debates on the 
cosmopolitan future and efforts to apply the precautionary principle, in networks of citizen 
groups and academics. All had to suspend the metaphors discussed in this paper and reach 
beyond the knowledge encoded in the ‘clock-work universe’, ‘rational man’ and ‘spaceship 
earth’. All struggled to find more appropriate bases for understanding socio-environmental 
and socio-economic relationships as well as their own role in the scheme of things. Implicitly 
or explicitly they are grappling with the temporal complexities involved: with the 
incompatibilities rooted in the timescapes of bodies, clocks and information networks, with 
time lags and multiple contingencies, with uncertainty and indeterminacy, with time-space 
distantiation and irreversibility, with memories, hopes and fears. All take their responsibility 
to the future seriously. Thus, in their very different ways, all can be regarded as guardians of 
the future. 
Looking back in history we find that first of all the future belonged to gods/God. Much later 
it was entrusted to priests and sovereigns as gods/God’s representatives on earth. Where the 
rule of gods/God has receded and society is organised in a largely secular way, it is 
individuals and their elected representatives which are entrusted with the future. In industrial 
societies, the future is understood with reference to its use value for the present. Accordingly, 
individuals are charged with the construction, control and colonisation of the future, to 
exploit it for their benefit in the present. This approach, as I have shown, makes 
environmentally sustainable action virtually impossible. It is therefore helpful to explore 
assumptions that are shared by people and groups who see themselves as guardians rather 
than asset strippers of the future.  
Whether tree huggers, road protesters or members of the women’s Network for Vorsorgendes 
Wirtschaften, these people see themselves not as engineers controlling a mechanical world of 
finite resources but as connected in a seamless, interdependent, dynamic whole to fellow 
human beings, animals and plants past, present and future. They understand their 
environmental concerns primarily as moral and spiritual matters and argue that the economic 
and political solutions have to arise from this primary base. Moreover, they are aware that 
problems caused by science and technology are rarely best served by techno-scientific fixes 
just as problems that originate from a particular economic logic tend not to be solved with 
more of the same. Responsibility is foregrounded in an attitude of care and compassion. In 
their effort to render the opaque open to their concerns, they use their imagination to achieve 
a kind of ‘memory of the future’ necessary to work towards time-sensitive sustainable socio-
environmental solutions. 
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